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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
MARY J. REHN,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,

Case No. 970700-CA

vs.

Priority (15)
CHARLES C. REHN,
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a final decree of divorce within this Court's jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

and

Issue 1: The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount
length of its alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines;
and for its award of attorneys fees.
Standard of Review: Trial judges are given "some discretion" in

deteimining mixed questions of fact and law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah
1994). Trial Courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in divorce cases,
and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is
demonstrated.

Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). In

reviewing child . . . support proceedings,. . . [we] will not disturb the district court's
actions unless the court exceeded . . . its . . . discretion. Woodward v. Woodward, 709
1

P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); We review . . . for correctness to the extent it involves
questions of statutory interpretation. Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah Dep }t of Tramp., 896 P.2d
632, 633 (Utah 1995); Even though the trial court has considerable latitude to adjust
financial and property interests, an appellate court will reverse for abuse of discretion.
Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993); "Whether the trial court's findings
of fact in support... of attorney fees are sufficient is . . . a question of law, reviewed for
correctness. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc. 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996).
Grounds for Review: The amount of alimony issue is preserved on the
record at Tr. 112-113 and Ex. J.1 The length of alimony issue is preserved on the record
at Tr. 10. The child support issue is preserved on the record at Tr. 3, Tr. 94, Tr. 96-97,
Ex. J.2 The division of debts issue is preserved on the record at Tr. 114.3 The attorneys
fees issue is preserved at Tr. 8.

1

At Tr. 112-114, Charles' attorney argues that Mary is free to seek a full time position
commensurate with her rate of pay in 1992 of over $13.00/hour and that some of her expenses are
inflated. Ex. J is a list of Charles' living expenses.
2

At Tr. 3, Mary's attorney states the stipulation of the parties: "Visitation would be
awarded to Defendant in a minimum of the standard and reasonable visitation by Utah Code
Annotated 30-3-35. The parties have also cooperated well together in sharing the time with the
children, and when one party is working, the other party caring for the children. I think that
should continue. They both agree." At Tr. 96-97, Charles testifies that over the eighteen month
separation the amount of time he has had the children is 45% of the days and nights and Charles'
attorney states on the record that the parties agree that is the amount.
3

At Tr. 114, Charles' attorney argues for equal division of debts.
2

Issue 2; The trial court erred in excluding Charles's witness regarding Mary's
underemployment and income potential.
Standard of Review: "We will not interfere with a trial court's case
management unless its actions amount to an abuse of discretion." Sfi£ Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980).
Grounds for Review: The witness exclusion issue is preserved at Tr. 79-89
andTr. 111.4

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth in full in
Addendum C attached to the Brief:
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5; Utah Code Ann. §78-45-2(13); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant Charles Rehn appeals that portion of the divorce decree awarding
excessive alimony to Mary Rehn and excessive child support, and ordering Charles to pay

4

At Tr. 79-89, the parties argue the issue of witness exclusion, the court rules and
Charles' attorney proffers the testimony. At Tr. Ill, Charles' attorney moves for a continuance
of the trial in order to permit vocational experts to testify.
3

80% of a $19,000 I.R.S. obligation and $6,884.80 of Mary's attorney's fees. Charles also
appeals the trial court's exclusion of his witness, Jim White, from testifying at trial. The
Decree and Findings of Fact, entered September 26, 1997 are attached as Addenda A and
B, respectively.
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition
The plaintiffs complaint for divorce and Charles's Counterclaim were tried
August 14, 1997 before the Hon. Pat B. Brian in Summit County, Utah. The Trial Court
entered the Findings and Decree on September 26, 1997, granting a divorce, dividing
debts and awarding child support, alimony and attorney's fees (our pp. 119-130,
Addendum A and B).
The formal divorce decree entered September 26, 1997 awarded to Mary
$1,045.00 of monthly child support; and $1,200.00 per month permanent alimony based
on her claimed 1996 net income of $1,072.00 from various part time jobs. The Court also
ordered Charles to pay $6,884.80 of Mary's attorney's fees and 80% of the parties'
approximate $19,000.00 IRS obligation.
Defendant, Charles Rehn, filed a timely appeal.
Statement of the Facts
Charles and Mary Rehn were married in Story County, Iowa, on August 27, 1977.
Two boys, ages six (6) and nine (9), are issue of the marriage. (Tr. 12-13.) Both boys
attend public school in the Park City School District full time. (Tr. 43-44.) The parties
4

separated in February 1996. Since the parties' separation, Charles has had and continues
to have the children forty-five percent (45%) of the days and nights in the year. The
parties stipulated that they each would have joint legal care, custody and control of the
children. (Tr. 3).
At trial the parties stipulated that Charles had the children forty-five percent (45%)
of the days and nights. (Tr. 96-97) The attorneys read into the record the stipulation of
the parties that their pattern of sharing the children should continue. (Tr.3). Charles paid
for all of the family health insurance over and above the court ordered support and also
provided housing, utilities and food for the boys when they were with him. (Tr. 89-94,
Ex. J.).
Following their separation, Charles voluntarily paid total family support to Mary
in the amount of $ 1,400.00 per month. This amount was agreed upon by the parties and
was paid in weekly increments. (Tr. 35.) On May 21, 1996, the trial court entered a
temporary order raising family support to $1,789.93 per month; $750.00 of which was
designated as temporary alimony. (Tr. 94.)
Mary earned her M.B.A. degree with an emphasis in marketing in 1985. She also
has bachelors degrees in food and nutrition and dietetics. (Tr. 19-20, 86.) She has
worked throughout the parties' marriage in the food service industry. In 1992, Mary
voluntarily quit her position as the Food Service Director of the Park City School District
at over $13.00/hr. (Tr. 10-14.) Since 1992, she has worked several part-time jobs. (Tr.
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15, 16.) Presently, she chooses to work part time as a waitress at a Park City restaurant,
a ticket taker at a Park City ski resort and in the Dan's Foods catering department. Her
income now is $1,429.00 per month gross which is $6.87 an hour. (Ex. 3 and 5.) In
seeking employment, Mary has limited her job applications to Park City businesses and to
positions requiring work only during public school hours. (Tr. 38-40).
Charles is employed as the managing engineer of Harding Lawson Associates' Salt
Lake Office. (Tr. 74.) He has the highest position in this company in Salt Lake City.
(Tr. 77.) Four weeks prior to trial, Charles received an annual pay raise of $2,000.00
making his gross monthly income $6,833.33 per month. (Tr. 74-75.)
In a pre-trial telephone conference the day before trial, Charles's counsel
requested a witness who had been identified to opposing counsel in writing immediately
after Mr. White was retained two days prior to trial. (Tr. 79-82). He would testify as to
employment opportunities in the Salt Lake City and Park City areas for Appellee with
two bachelor degrees and a M.B.A. (Tr. 80.) The judge said trial could be put off two to
three months and alimony could be raised to assure there would be no financial prejudice
to Appellee by delaying the trial date. (Tr. 80.) This would allow Appellee to have time
to find an expert vocational witness. Appellee's counsel later left a telephone message
with Charles's counsel stating that his client had agreed to the continuance. (P. 80, 85.)
After Mary's attorney agreed to the continuance, Charles' attorney set a trial date and
called Mary's attorney to inform him. At that time, Mary's attorney said no, "I am going
6

to trial [tomorrow]." (p. 80.) At trial, there was no motion in limine to exclude the
witness. There was no otiljection to the witness by Appellee until Mr. White was put
called to the stand at the end of the trial. (Tr. 79.) The judge then excluded the witness
and denied Charles's motion to continue the trial for purposes of receiving testimony
from expert vocational witness based on the lateness of the designation and the inability
of Mary to consult another expert prior to trial. (Tr. 84.)
At trial, the court ordered that alimony be increased from $750.00 a month to
$1,200.00 a month. (Add. B.) The trial court ordered $1045/month child support based
on the sole support table. (Add. B.)
Mary estimated her disposable income as $l,072/month, leaving her $3,316 or
more disposable income after receipt of support. (Ex. 3). Mary estimated Charles
disposable income was $2,880/month after payment of support. (Ex. 3, Ex. J). Charles'
unrefuted testimony was that his monthly expenses for himself and two children at home
forty-five percent (45%) of the time were $3,200 per month before any support, day care
or debt service was paid. (Ex. J)
In addition to support, the court ordered Charles to pay $15,200.00 of the I.R.S.
debt. (Add. B) In addition, the court ordered Charles to pay $6880.00 of Mary's
attorney fees, over and above his own attorneys fees of approximately the same amount.
Mary desires to live and work in the Park City area and lives in subsidized housing at a
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rent of $530.00 per month. (Tr. 26, 38-39) Charles continues to reside in the parties'
marital condominium at Jeremy Ranch with a rent of $1,000.00 per month. (Ex. J.)
Two days before trial, Charles retained a vocational expert witness. The same
day, Charles' attorney sent a letter to Mary's attorney notifying him of the witness. In a
pre-trial telephone conference the day before trial Charles's counsel requested to put on a
witness who could testify as to employability of Appellee with two bachelor degrees and
a M.B.A. in the Salt Lake economy. Appellee's coimsel objected because of insufficient
notice. The judge said we could put off trial for two-to-three months and raise the
alimony to $900.00 per month to assure that there would be no financial prejudice to
Appellee by delaying the trial date. This would allow Mary to have time to find an expert
vocational witness. Appellee's counsel later left a telephone message with Charles'
counsel stating that his client agreed to the continuance. After agreeing to the
continuance, Charles' counsel set a new trial for April 15, 1998. When Charles' attorney
called Mary's attorney back, he said, "I am going to trial [tomorrow]." At trial, there was
no motion in limine to exclude Charles' vocational expert. There was no objection to the
witness by Appellee until he was put on the stand at the end of the trial. The judge then
excluded the witness based on the lateness of the designation of Charles's witness and
denied Charles's motion to continue the trial for purpose of receiving testimony from
expert vocational witnesses. (Tr. 79-89)

8

The court had set no deadlines for the designation of witnesses and ordered no
exchange of expert witnesses before trial. (Add. D).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although the court awarded $1,200.00 of alimony to Mary, there were no findings
that Charles on the issues of Charles' expenses and whether Charles is able to pay the
ordered alimony. Charles makes $6,833/month but after almost $2,000/month in taxes
and monthly expenses of $3,200 for himself and the children who are with him 45% of
the time, there is not enough money to cover $2,245/month in support. (Add. E)
Further the findings of Mary's need were conclusory and did not address the
factual conflicts between the testimony of Mary Rehn and her estimated expenses in
Exhibit 2 attached to Addendum 1. The finding of Mary's need of Attorney's fees is also
cursory and doesn't address the apparent fact that Mary with a substantial support
payment on top of her income is better able to pay her fees than is Charles.
The court also finds that Mary was not underemployed. However there are no
specific findings on the issue although this is a disputed issue: Mary has had significant
experience in food services management from 1977 - 1992 and she has bachelors degrees
in dietetics and nutrition and has an M.B. A. in marketing. Instead of working in her field
where she was earning over $13.00/hour in late 1992, Mary chooses to work various part
time jobs at an average of $6.87/hour so that she only has to work when the children are
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in school or with their father. (Tr. 36.) Because the court failed to make adequate
findings as to its orders this case must be reversed and remanded.
The court erroneously excluded the vocational expert witness of Charles from
testifying at the trial. Therefore, this case should be remanded for a new trial.
Charles should have been ordered to pay child support based on the joint custody
schedule under Udy v. Ucty, 893 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah App. 1995). The parties
have agreed that they will continue to share the children as they have done. Charles has
had the children forty five percent (45%) of the time. Yet the court used the sole custody
worksheet without making findings for its deviation from the statute.
ARGUMENT
Point I
The trial court failed to make the necessary findings for the amount and length of its
alimony award; for its deviation from the child support guidelines; for its debt
allocation; and for its award of attorneys fees.
A.

Amount of Alimony.
1.

Factors in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

Although trial Courts have considerable discretion in determining alimony in
divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of
discretion is demonstrated, Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988),
failure to consider the Jones factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96, 101 (Utah 1986). The Jones factors are:
10

a.

The financial conditions and needs of the [spouse seeking

b.

The ability of the [spouse seeking support] to produce a

support];

sufficient income for [himself or] herself; and
c.

The ability of the [payor spouse] to provide support.
Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Utah App.
1996).

These factors are discussed in detail, as follows:
a.

The Financial Conditions and Needs of Mary.

The court made the following findings as to Mary's need: "the plaintiff clearly has
the need for support." (Findings paragraph 37). "$3,300 is not an unreasonable monthly
expense for a mother and two children." (Findings paragraph 7). "The plaintiffs needs
are well established at $3317." (Findings paragraph 40, Ex. 2). "Those needs are
reasonable, and are real." (Findings paragraph 33),
However, the court made no findings to explain the undisputed evidence that the
following expenses listed in Exhibit 2 are not actual expenses of Mary:
Mary estimates a monthly expense of $ 125.00 for counselor and
attorney's fees, although the court ordered Charles to pay $6850.00 in
Mary's attorney's fees. The court made no finding as to evidence that

11

Mary needed $125/month. in alimony to cover what the court had ordered
Charles to pay. (Ex.2, Add. B)
Mary estimated $ 136.00 of child care expense, although it was
undisputed that Mary is choosing part time work so that she can be at home
with the children after school and during their school breaks. (Tr. 43)
Mary estimated she spent $150.00/month. for schooling for herself
and the children, although it was undisputed that she was not currently
enrolled in school and the children are in public school. (Tr. 21,43)
Mary projected her entertainment expense will be $345.00, although
it is undisputed that when the Rehn's lived together they averaged
$217/month. on entertainment from February to September, 1995. (Ex. M;
Add. F)
The court makes no finding as to how it calculated Mary's taxes at the same rate to
determine net income of $1078 when it is undisputed that Charles had a much higher
taxable income and she is awarded both children as tax exemptions and credits. (Ex. 2,
Add. A) There was no evidence that Mary was not able to meet her expenses with
support at $l,400.00/month. or $l,789.00/month. before the court raised it to
$2,245.00/month. There was no finding that Mary's needs changed from when the parties
agreed at separation that the needs of the Petitioner over and above her income was
$1,400.00 a month total support although this issue was disputed. (Tr. 35).

12

Without a finding by the court as to which expenses it has used to determine
Mary's monthly needs in light of the undisputed evidence against the need for several of
Mary's claimed expenses listed in Ex. 2, it is impossible to determine how the court
reached its final determination of Mary's need. Without adequate findings of need, the
court abused its discretion in making an alimony award.
b.

The Ability of Mary to Produce a Sufficient Income for Herself.

Although the court finds no issue of underemployment, the court has not heard all
of the evidence because Charles' witness was improperly excluded. In addition, the
findings made by the court do not show how the court determined that Mary does not
need to work in her field at the pay level she has achieved historically.
The court made the following findings as to the earning capacity of Mary: "The
record is unchallenged that for months on end she has worked weekends and holidays.
She has scrounged for multiple jobs, some of them perhaps less dignified and less
rewarding financially and otherwise than she would like to have, but, nevertheless, she
has bent her back and gone to work. And the court finds there is just simply no issue of
unemployment or underemployment, based on the historical roles the plaintiff and
Charles have assumed in this marriage." {Findings paragraph 13). "The ability to earn
income definitely favors Charles. The ratio is about 80 percent to the defendant, 20
percent to the plaintiff." {Findings paragraphs 8-9).

13

However, the trial court made no finding to explain the unrebutted evidence that
when Mary took a full time position in 1992 she earned over $13.00/hr. while her current
part time jobs pay her an average rate of only $6.87 per hour.
The court may use historical earnings to evaluate a spouse's earning capacity. In
1977, the court also decided Westenskow v. Westenskow 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977). In
that case, the plaintiff/husband was earning a salary of $18,000.00 when he terminated
his employment and organized his own company. Finding the trial court's award of
alimony and child support in increasing increments was not inequitable, the court stated:
It would be reasonable for the court to infer that either
plaintiffs income from his business would increase or he
would seek other employment with adequate remuneration,
reflecting his historical earning ability. Id
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court again addressed the issue of historical
earnings in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1985). The husband's income fluctuated
depending on current business contracts. At the time of the trial, he had no current
income, but was negotiating a contract. The lower court correctly considered the
husband's historical earnings:
We have held that where the husband has experienced a
temporary decrease in income, his historical earnings must be
taken into account in determining the amount of alimony to be
paid.
Id. At 566.

14

Facts about Mary's underemployment were disputed. Mary voluntarily cut down
to part time work to care for the small children. (Tr. 14). However, now the children are
in school full time. She is qualified for the work force with many years of work
experience in food and nutrition, from at least 1977-1992. As recently as 1992 she was
earning over $13.00/hour. (Tr. 13). Mary has two bachelor's degrees in the food service
area and an M.B.A. in marketing. Yet Mary chooses to work in jobs that allow her to be
with her children when they are not in school and to stay in Park City for work. (Tr.39).
This undisputed evidence suggests that Mary has education and work experience
to qualify her for higher paying jobs. Yet there is no finding to explain how the court
reached its decision that Mary was not underemployed. Because the court made
inadequate specific findings in support of its determination of the issue of
underemployment, the court abused its discretion.
c.

The Ability of Charles to Provide Support.

Charles is making a good salary. However, the court made no findings whatsoever
as to what his expenses and disposable income are. From the court's findings we do not
know whether he can afford the amount of court ordered support after he meets his
expenses for himself and the children when they are with him.
The court made the following findings on this issue: "The ability to earn income
definitely favors Charles The ratio is about 80 percent to the defendant, 20 percent to the
plaintiff." (Findings paragraphs 8-9).

The court also found that "the defendant clearly
15

i

has the ability to pay." {Findings paragraph 37). "Regarding the monthly expenses of
the parties, the court finds that, in nearly every case that comes before the court, the
parties are simply going to have to tighten up their belts and make do with less, and that
is certainly no exception in this particular case." {Findings paragraph 20).
In Bell v.Bell 810 P.2d at 489 (Utah App. 1991), the court stated: "The trial court
must make sufficiently detailed findings of fact on each factor to enable a reviewing court
to ensure that the trial court's discretionary determination was rationally based upon these
three factors." Id.
However, the court made no findings in this case either as to the amount of
Charles' available income or as to Charles' reasonable expenses.
It was undisputed that Mary's net income with support will be at least
$3,316/month. (Plaintiff's Exh. 2). Charles' net monthly income after paying the court
ordered support will be no more than $2,880 per month, which is at least $436/month.
less than Mary's net income. (Plaintiff s Exh. 2).
It was undisputed that Charles' monthly expenses for himself and two children at
home forty-five percent (45%) of the time were $3,200 per month before any support,
day care or debt service was paid. (Ex. J, Add. E). His housing expense is
$500.00/month. more than Mary's as he is not in subsidized housing. He has higher
transportation costs because he commutes to work from Jeremy Ranch to Salt Lake City

16

while Mary works locally and he has a $200/month higher auto payment on the 1995
Honda Accord.
The court abused its discretion by failing to make specific findings as to the ability
of Charles to pay alimonyj
2. Permanent Alimony
Although the court awarded permanent alimony, it made no findings as to the basis
for this award. (Findings paragraphs 30, 36).
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that
the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
See Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h). The parties'marriage was twenty years. Twenty
years should be the longest alimony continues without specific findings to the contrary.
Because the court did not make the findings required in § 30-3-5(7)(h) of
extenuating circumstances in support of a permanent alimony award and because there
were no extenuating circumstances in evidence from which the court could make findings
supporting a permanent alimony award, this order of the court must be reversed.
B.

Child Support

The court read the following finding regarding child support. "The child support
in this case has been stipulated to, pursuant to the guidelines." (Findings paragraph 18).
The court then ordered child support based on a sole custody schedule. The parties did
17

not stipulate to use the sole custody schedule. The court made no findings on how it
reached the determination to use the sole custody schedule instead of the joint custody
schedule.
U.C.A. §78-45-2(13) provides that there is joint physical custody if "the child
stays with each parent overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents
contribute to the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support." U.C.A. §§
78-45-7.2 requires the court to use the joint custody worksheet when the children are with
both parents more than twenty five percent (25%) of the nights and pay more than the
court ordered child support to care for the children unless the court makes specific
findings supporting deviation from the guidelines. In Udy v. Udy, 893 P.2d 1097, 10991100 (Utah App. 1995), the court found that "the trial court awarded Mr. Udy visitation
that exceeded the threshold for joint physical custody under section 78-45-2(10)
[predecessor statute to U.C.A. §78-45-2(13)]" Id. Therefore, in Udy, the court found an
abuse of discretion by the court below because the court made no findings as to its
deviation from the joint custody guidelines. See Id.
It is undisputed that Charles has had the children for weeks at a time and has
provided their food, housing, utilities and all of their medical insurance over and above
the court ordered support. (Tr. 94 Ex. I, J). Both parties stipulated that in the eighteen
(18) months of separation, Charles had the children an average of forty five percent
(45%) of the days and nights. Further, the parties agreed on the record to continue their
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pattern of cooperating in sharing time with the children. (Tr.3). This part of the
stipulation of the parties on the record did not make it onto the Findings prepared by
Mary's attorney.
"If the court does not follow Utah's child support guidelines to order a joint
custody child support worksheet, it must make findings of fact justifying its deviation."
Udy at p. 1100. The court made no specific findings justifying its deviation from the
guidelines here. Because there were no specific findings as to the court's deviation from
an award of child support under the joint custody guidelines as required by U.C.A. § 7845-7.2(3), the court abused its discretion.
C.

Debt Allocation.

The court found that the distribution of debt should be 80% the responsibility of
Charles. However, the bases for this determination is not explained in any finding. After
the court has redrawn the lines of who has what income via its support orders, why the
court requires debt payment in proportion to incomes prior to support payments cannot be
determined absent findings.
Trial judges are given "some discretion" in determining mixed questions of fact
and law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-40 (Utah 1994). In re Estate of Knickerbocker
, 912 P.2d 969, 977 (Utah 1996) the court commented: "In a divorce action, the trial court
must be able to make such orders concerning the . . . debts . . .as will be fair and
reasonable to all concerned." Id. However, it appears that the trial court awarding a
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larger portion of the debt to the party who has higher monthly expenses and less
disposable
To permit appellate review of a property and debt distribution, the distribution
must be based upon adequate factual findings and must be in accordance with the
standards set by this states's appellate courts. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843
(Utah App. 1994). Failure to make findings on all material facts is reversible error unless
the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted and capable of supporting only a finding
in favor of the judgment. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1990).
Not only does Mary have at least $3,316 disposable income compared to Charles
$2,880 or less of disposable income, but also Charles has been required to pay $6,880 of
Mary's attorney's fee as well. (Ex. 3, Add. B). While at the same time, Charles has not
only a $500/month. higher rent than Mary and a $200/month. higher car payment than she
does, but he also has the children almost as often as well. This debt service adds several
hundred dollars per month to Charles's monthly expenses. With more disposable income,
a fair result would be for Mary to bear the larger portion of the marital debt.
There are no findings as to what facts the court relied on when it ordered Charles
to pay 80% of the income tax debt. This issue should be remanded with the other issues
above for the court to enter findings in support of its order.
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D.

Attorneys Fees.
The court ordered Charles to pay $6,880 of Mary's attorney fee bill.

{Findings paragraph 28). The court finds generally that "Plaintiff has the need for
assistance with her attorney fees and Defendant has the ability to pay." {Findings
paragraph 26). However, the court does not make any detailed findings applying the facts
of this. The ratio of Charles' share of Mary's bill is the same as the ratio applied by the
court in dividing the marital. However, this similarity is not explained by the court.
There is no finding to explain this ratio other than that the gross income of Charles in
1996 was 80% of the household income. (Ex.3). This fraction seems especially
insignificant after the court has cause Mary to actually have more disposable income than
Charles has with the court's award of alimony and child support. (Ex. 3, Add. B).
"An award of fees must be based upon findings of the financial need of the
receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees." Willeyv. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149, 1155 (Utah App. 1996). Where the
award is based on need, the trial court must support the award with adequate findings
detailing the reasonableness of the amount awarded and the need of the receiving party.
Finlayson v. Finlayson 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494
(Utah App. 1991).
**
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In Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991), the record contained
"substantial evidence" of the parties' financial situation and the reasonableness of the fee.
And, "one very general finding addressed financial need." This court reversed the award
and remanded for redetermination because the findings failed to evaluate the relevant
factors in concluding there was no need to award any fee. / d.; see also Adelman v.
Adelman, 815 P.2d 741, 746 (Utah 1991) (the award of attorneys fees in enforcement
proceeding must be based on finding of need); Rudman, 812 P.2d at 79-80, (Orme, J.,
concurring, cautions against starting with the award and then working backwards to
attempt to support it.)
When there are no findings to support a claim of a reasonable fee award or of need
to an award, the fee award must be reversed. Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah
App. 1991) (no finding or evidence of wife's need for fees); Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494.
There was also no evidence as to Mary's inability to pay her fees. Mary built into
her expense affidavit, referred to in the findings as the basis for her alimony award, a
monthly counselor's/attorney's fee payment of $125.00 presumably this will enable her to
pay her attorney's fee bill. Further, the undisputed evidence is that Charles has at least
$426/month. less disposable income than Mary after his support payments, while having
the children 45% of the time. (Tr. 3, 96-97). In addition, Charles has his own unpaid
attorneys fee and $15,200.00 of marital debt to pay.
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Mary's attorney fee award is unsupported by any factual finding of need or of
Charles' There was no testimony by Mary that she could not afford to pay her attorney's
fees, ability to pay. Considering the lack of factual findings, the award of attorney fee
should be reversed.
Point 2
The trial court erred in excluding Charles's witness regarding Ms. Rehn's
underemployment and income potential.
Defendant informed plaintiffs attorney by written fax two days before trial that he
intended to call an vocational expert witness which had been retained that day. The
witness was disclosed as soon as Charles attorney located and retained the witness. (Tr.
81). The day before trial the court suggested to counsel that the matter be continued for
the very purpose of allowing plaintiff to obtain an expert on the issue of plaintiff s
employability. The telephone conference entered with an agreement between the court
and counsel in a request to plaintiffs counsel that he be allowed to contact his client
regarding the court's suggestion. Plaintiffs counsel later left a message that his client
had agreed to the continuance. (Tr. 80,82) It was only after defendant's attorney had
received the message from Mary's attorney that he called the court and set a new trial
date for January 15, 1998. Upon relaying that message to Mr. Cathcart, Mr. Cathcart said
he was not going to wait until January, he was going to trial the next day.
In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 294
(Utah App. 1992), the court stated:
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The court's power to sanction a party for failure to cooperate
in discovery comes from Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides that if a party fails to obey
an order, entered under Rule 26(f), the court may prohibit the
offending party from introducing designated matters into
evidence.
At the trial, Mary's attorney did not make a motion in limine to exclude the
witness who he now knew would be testifying for the defense. At the end of the trial,
when Mr. White was called to testify, plaintiffs attorney objected that this testimony was
prejudicial to his client because she needed finality to the divorce. The court did not cite
any rule or authority at law under which it was excluding the witness. The basis of the
court's exclusion of the witness was that the witness' identity was disclosed at the
eleventh hour which did not give Mary a chance to retain her own expert witness. (Tr.
84).
The expert vocational witness would testify as to the issues addressed by Utah
Code Ann.§ 78-45-7.5 (7)(b): "employment potential and probable earnings as derived
from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community." Id. This crucial testimony to establishing
Mary's ability to earn at a higher wage level with her experience and credentials may
have persuaded the judge to have taken a different outlook on the alimony factors in
Jones. If Charles established through this witness that Mary is very employable at a
higher wage, then he would also likely show that she had the ability to provide for more
or all of her own needs.
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In Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande Western R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 296
(Utah App. 1992), the court went on to state:
We hold that absent an order creating a judicially imposed
deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party by excluding
its witnesses under rule 37(b)(2). See Inner City Wrecking
Co. v. Bilsky, 51 Ohio App.2d 220, 367 N.E.2d 1214, 1218
(1977) (without an order compelling compliance with court
rules,m the sanction imposed by trial court was beyond its
authority)s in.
In this case, none of the four scheduling orders produced by the court required
that witnesses be disclosed by a certain deadline. (Addendum D). Charles' attorney was
not in violation of any court order by designating an expert witness two days before trial.
In Berrett, the court reversed for a new trial.

As in Berrett, the trial court here

abused its discretion. The court should reverse the trial court decision and remand for a
new trial.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's award to Mary of child support on the sole custody guidelines the
award of $1200.00/month of alimony, the allocation of debt and the award of fees should
be reversed and remanded for the court to enter sufficient findings. Because substantial
rights of Charles were prejudiced by the erroneous exclusion of Charles' vocational
expert, this case should be remanded for a new trial of this case.
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Respectfully submitted this

/

day of May 1998.
HENRIOD, NIELSEN & CHRISTENSEN

Steve S. Christensen
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809
Attorney for Plaintiff
380 North 200 West. #103
Bountiftil, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 295-2391
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MARY J. REHN.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 964300048
CHARLES C. REHN,
Judge Pat B. Brian
Defendant.
Plaintiff's Complaint for Divorce and Defendant's Counter-Claim for Divorce were heard
before the coun in trial on August 14, 1997, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge presiding.
Plaintiff was present and represented by her counsel, Terry L, Cathcart; Defendant was present
and represented by his counsel, Steve S. Christensen.
The court having reviewed all of the exhibits admitted by both Plaintiff and Defendant,
having reviewed the law applicable to this matter and having heard argument for both counsel,
now enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The coun rules on this matter in a fair, even-handed manner, to inspire fairness by

Plaintiff to Defendant and Defendant to Plaintiff.

* *%' ^::S~'
CL.

~rc-

§* **
<r '*

2.

There was a time in the parties' relationship when they loved each other dearly.

They entered into a marriagerelationshipandfornearly 20 years lived together as a family unit.
3.

Plaintiff was a bona fide resident of Summit County, Utah, and has been for a

period in excess of three (3) months immediately preceding the commencement of this action.
4.

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having been married in Story City,

Iowa, (Story County), on August 27, 1977.
5.

During the course of the marriage the parties have become unable to resolve or

reconcfle their differences; these irreconcilable differences have led to the complete breakdown
of the marital relationship.
6.

After looking careftilly at all of the exhibits entered with the court, the court now

focuses on the two or three exhibits that become the heart and soul of the court's ruling.
7.

Plaintiff's monthly expenses, as listed in Plaintiff's Exhibit #2, appear to be

reasonable for three (3) people. The court finds that $3300 is not an unreasonable monthly
expense for a mother and two (2) children, when the two (2) children are going to become more
expensive with the passing of every month in their lives.
8.

Historically, and as far as the court can sec into the future, the ability to earn

income definitely favors Defendant.
9>

The ratio of earned income is approximately 80 percent of the total family income

attributable to Defendant's wages and 20 percent attributable to Plaintiffs wages.
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10.

There has been no basis to contend or evidence entered that Plaintiff has been

unwilling to try or has been lacking in her effort to pull her share.
11.

The record is unchallenged that for months on end, Plaintiff has worked on

weekends and holidays to provide for her family.
12.

She has scrounged for multiple jobs, some of them perhaps less dignified and less

rewardingfinanciallyand otherwise than she would have liked to have, but nevertheless, she has
bent her back and gone to work.
13.

There is no issue of unemployment or underemployment based on the historical

roles Plaintiff and Defendant have assumed in this marriage.
14.

Plaintiff has been the primary care taker of the children.

15.

The children have been young; die youngest is just barely entering into the first

16.

The emphasis of the parties has been properly placed in making sure that the

grade.

children have been cared for properly by their mother.
17.

Therefore, in deciding the issues of money, the court finds that the ratio of 80

percent attributable to Defendant and 20 percent attributable to Plaintiff is appropriate in light of
the evidence.
18.

Child support in this case has been stipulated to, pursuant to the guidelines, and

should be awarded in accordance with those guidelines. (See Child Support Schedule entered as
Plaintiff s Exhibit #5),
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19.

Child support should be ordered to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff in the amount

of $ 1045 per month, one-half (V4) of that amount to be paid on the fifth (5th) and one-half (Vi)
of the twentieth (20th) of each month beginning immediately. (See PlaintifTs Exhibit 5).
20.

Regarding the monthly expenses of die parties, the court finds that in nearly every

case that coxnes before the court, the parties are simply going to have to tighten up their belts and
make do with less, and that is certainly no exception in this case.
21.

The debt that can and should be attributable as marital debt is the debt to the IRS

in the approximate amount of $19,000.
22.

The court finds that the IRS debt is a marital debt and the debt should be ordered

to be paid 80 percent by Defendant and 20 percent by Plaintiff,
23.

That debt may possibly be reduced by further negotiations with the IRS, but

whatever the ultimate, final debt is, it should be ordered to be paid on that basis.
24.

There are no other marital debts that need be addressed by the court or paid by the

parties.
25.

There have been approximately $8600 incurred by Plaintiff in legal fees and costs.

26.

The courtfindsthat Plaintiff has the need for assistance with her attorney*s fees and

Defendant has the ability to pay.
27.

Further, the fees were necessarily incurred by Plaintiff in this matter; the work

accomplished was reasonable given the scope and time of the case, and the charge pet hour by
PlaintifTs counsel was appropriate for his experience, the nature of the work accomplished and
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the rates normally charged by attorneys of his experience and expertise.
28.

Defendant should be ordered to pay 80 percent of those fees and costs, or a stun

of $6880 to be paid by Defendant for Plaintiffs attorney's fees.
29.

The court has considered a number of principles, both equitable and legal in nature

to determine the appropriate award of alimony.
30.

This is a 20-year marriage where alimony is appropriate. Alimony should be

awarded permanently for at least 20 years, until, if and when, there is a legal event that would
terminate the payment or the receipt of alimony.
31.

The desire of the court is, as far as possible, to fairly and evenly establish a living

standard for the parties which may be virtually impossible to achieve with exactness, but
nevertheless, the court believes that there are principles that will accomplish that for die most part.
32.

Plaintiffs needs are set at approximately $3300 per month for her and two (2)

children, (See Plaintiff s Exhibit 2).
33.

Those needs are reasonable and are real.

34.

Plaintiffs established spendable income, working as industriously as possible, has

historically resulted in $1072 per month in income from her various jobs. (See Plaintiffs Exhibits
1 and 3).
35.

Child support has been ordered to be paid in the amount of $1045 per month.

36.

The court finds that alimony should be ordered to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff

in the amount of $1200 per month permanently, one-half (V4) of that amount to be paid on the fifth
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(5th) and one-half (V4) on the twentieth (20th) of each month until terminated by law.
37.

Defendant clearly has the ability to pay and Plaintiff clearly has the need for

support.
38.

Alimony has been carefully considered factoring in the length of the marriage,

disparity in the abilities of the parties to earn income, die historical roles of both parties have
played in this family during the 20-year marriage, the age of the little children who are the
primary responsibility of the Plaintiff, and all other pertinent factors.
39.

Adding Plaintiffs historical gross monthly income of $1072, monthly child support

as awarded by the court of $1045 and $1200 in alimony, Plaintiff will receive approximately
$3317.
40*

Her needs are well established at $3317 and the award of alimony is as fair and

even as the court is capable of ruling.
41.

The court will not set a review in this matter. If either party believes the question

of family support should be reviewed, they may request that review and the court will determine
whether or not the requirements set forth within the statute regarding change of circumstances
have been met.
42.

Furthermore, the court finds that the parties have agreed and stipulated to certain

items as follows:
A.

^ygTQPY: Each party should be awarded the joint legal care, custody and

control of the minor children, to wit:
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Kyle McKensie, d.o.b. 3/11/S8; and
Shawn Clinton, d.o.b. 3/12/91.
Furthermore, Plaintiff should be designated as the primary physical ctistodian and
Defendant the secondary physical custodian.
B.

VISITATION: Defendant should be awarded the standard and reasonable

visitation in accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35. Furthermore, Defendant should
be prohibited from using alcohol immediately before or during visitation.
C.

fiEAL

pftQPERTY: There is no real property owned by the parties and thus

no allocation is necessary.
D.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: Personal property should be awarded on the

following basis:
(1)

Plaintiff:
(a)

all items of her personal clothing, jewelry and other personal

(b)

one-half (V4) of Defendant's retirement and retirement

effects;

accounts which were accrued during the marriage;
(c)

1996 Impreza Outback automobile; and

(d)

one-half (Vi) of any of Defendant's stock and investment

holdings.
(2)

Defendant:
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(a)

all items of his personal clothing, jewelry and other personal

(b)

the remainder of his retirement benefits, after the portion

effects;

awarded to Plaintiff, which were accrued during the marriage, and all such benefits which were
accrued before the marriage;
(c)

1995 Honda Accord automobile; and

(d)

one-half (V4) of any of Defendant's stock aAd investment

holdings.
E.

CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Each party should be ordered to MY one-half

(V4) of any work- or education-related child care expenses incurred by either party.
F.

INCOME TAX RFTTJRN: Each party should be ordered to file jointly for

tax year 1996 and divide any refund received from that filing. If there is any liability from that
filing, Plaintiff should be ordered to pay 20 percent of that liability and Defendant 80 percent of
that liability.
G.

INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS: Plaintiff should be awarded the income

tax deductions and exemptions for the minor children. If Defendant is current in all child support
and child care payments for the year in question as of December 31 of that tax year, Defendant
may take the exemptions and deductions for the minor children by reimbursing Plaintiff the
amount she pays iA taxes over and above the amount she would pay had she kept the exemptions
and deductions. Defendant should be ordered to pay that reimbursement to Plaintiff on or before
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April 10, five (5) days prior to the filing deadline.
H.

H E A L T H A N D ACCIDENT I N S U R A N T Defendant should h* onW»rf

to provide health and accident insurance for die minor children with each party paying one-half
(V£) of any out-of-pocket expenses. Furthermore, Defendant should be ordered to help coordinate
and insure Plaintiff is provided access to COBRA coverage under his insurance so long as
allowable by law. Plaintiff should be ordered to pay for any coverage for herself under the
COBRA plan.
I.

LIF^? INS1 FRANCE: Defendant should be ordered to maintain the current

policies of life insurance in the amount of $80,000 and $50,000 each, naming the children and
Plaintiff as beneficiaries so long as child support and alimony are payable to the children and
Plaintiff. Should alimony terminate. Defendant should be ordered to name the children as sole
beneficiaries of those policies.
J.

O R D E R T O WTTHHOLD A N D D E L I V E R : An order to withhold and

deliver is authorized although not implemented so long as Defendant maintains an automatic bank
transfer of all of his support payments from his checking account direcdy to Plaintiff's in the
appropriate amounts and times as ordered in the Decree. If implemented, Defendant should be
ordered to pay any administrative cost of the withholding,
K.

DIYQRCE EPVCATON CLASS: Each party has completed the Divorce

Education Class.
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L.

STQN ALL. PAPERS: Each party should be ordered to sign all papers,

documents, titles, deeds, etc., necessary to effectuate the transfer of personal property by and
between the parties as set forth.
The court having entered its Findings of Fact, now enters its:

CONTUSIONS OF LAW
Each party should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other to become final upon
entry on the records of the court.
All other issues between the parties should be ordered in accordance with the Findings
above,
DATED September*flj?6

>1997.

P£T B. BRIAN
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Defendant
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PLAINTIFFS MONTHLY EXPENSES
Rent

$520

Renter's Insurance

13

Maintenance (residence)(appliance maintenance/replacement)

50

Food and household supplies

500

Utilities (electricity and heat)

50

Telephone

50

Laundry and cleaning

50

Clothing

150

Medical (asthma prescriptions/allergy medications/podiatrist/optometrist)

125

Dental (Orthodontist, Kyle's retainer/braces(?))

50

Medical/Dental Insurance

185

Child care

136

School (children and myself)

150

Entertainment (memberships, travel, recreation, camps, sports)

345

Incidentals (grooming, alcohol, gifts and donations)

200

Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance)

226

Auto payments

341

Installment payment(s) (counselor and attorney's fees)

125

Other expenses (taxes)

50
TOTAL:

$3316

ALIMONY COMPUTATIONS

Elaiaiiff:

Defendant:

$ 1428 per month gross
x .75 net after taxes
$1072 net
[214] [child support]
$ 858
JfiLL alimony

$ 6833 per month gross
x .75 net after taxes
$5125 net
[10451 [child support]
$4080
[1611] [alimony]

$2469

$2469

Therefore, Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff alimony of $1,611
for the length of the marriage (20 years) or until earlier terminated by law.

TRIAL EXHIBIT 3

IN T"H THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN ANb—OR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF ITkwI
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLS CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

MARY J. REHN,
vs.

Civil No. 964300048 DA

CHARLES C. REHN,

1 1.
|

Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother
and father for whom support is to be awarded.

8
8
H 2b.
1
I 2c.
1

Refer to Instructions for definition of income.
Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do
not enter alimony ordered for this case)
Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter
obligations ordered for the children in Line 1).

i 2d.
1
I 3.
8

OPTIONAL: Enter the amountfromLine 12 of the
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent.
Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted
Gross Income for child support purposes.

B 4.
fl
B

Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of
children in Line 1 to the Support Table, Find the Base
Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.

1 5.
1

Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.

1 6.
1

Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each
parent's share of the Base Support Obligation.

MOTHER

FATHER

iiuumuit |

///////////// 1

! ///////////// ! /////////////
$

1,429

$

COMBINED

~TH

6,833

/////////////

|

/////////////

I

imiiitimi

J

litiiiiniin

|

///////////// 8
///////////// ]

/////////////
illill Mllit
$

1,429

/////////////
/////////////
1 /////////////

$

S

8,262 1

' $

1.259 |

6,833

I /////////////
/////////////
/////////////

0.17
J $

214 $

0.83

/////////////
Uillllltllll

|
|

1,045

j iiiiumiiii
/////////////

1
j

bmamsemameaaBs^mmmmm

Bring down the amount in Line 6 for (he
Obligor Parent or enter the amountfromthe Low Income Table.
j$

BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD:

8.

Which parent is the obligor?

9.

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7? (x) Yes
If NO, enter the amount ordered: $
, and answer number 10.

10.

What were the reasons stttted by the court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent

( ) Mother

(x) Father
( ) No

( ) other:

__
Attorney Bar No. 4809 ( ) Electronic Filing
TRIAL EXHIBIT 5

|
|

(x) Manual Filing
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TERRY L. CATHCART, #4809
Attorney for Plaintiff
380 North 200 West, #103
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 29S-2391
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Case No. 964300048
Judge Pat B. Brian

Plaintiffs Complaint for Divorce and Defendant's Counter-CIaim for Divorce were heard
before the court in trial on August 14, 1997, the Honorable Pat B, Brian, District Judge presiding.
Plaintiff was present and representedfayher counsel, Terry L. Cathcart; Defendant was present
and represented by his counsel, Steve S. Christensen.
The court having reviewed all of the exhibits admitted by both Plaintiff and Defendant,
having reviewed the law applicable to this matter, having heard argument for both counsel, and
having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law> now enters its:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.

DECREE: Each party is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other to become

final upon entry on the records of the court.

0 **%

2.

CUSTODY: Each party is awarded the joint legal care, custody and control of the

minor children, to wit:
Kyle McKensic, d.o.b. 3/11/88; and
Shawn Clinton, d.o.b. 3/12/91.
Furthermore, Plaintiff is designated as the primary physical custodian and Defendant the
secondary physical custodian.
3.

VISITATION: Defendant is awarded the standard and reasonable visitation in

accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35. Furthermore, Defendant is prohibited from
using alcohol immediately before or during visitation.
4.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: Personal property is awarded on the following basis:
A-

Plaintiff:
(1)

all items of her personal clothing, jewelry and other personal effects;

(2)

one-half (V£) of Defendant's retirement and retirement accounts

which were accrued during the marriage;

B.

(3)

1996 Impreza Outback automobile; and

(4)

one-half (%) of any of Defendant's stock and investment holdings.

Defendant:
(1)

all items of his personal clothing, jewelry and other personal effects;

(2)

the remainder of his retirement benefits, after the portion awarded

to Plaintiff, which we e accrued during the marriage, and all such benefits which were accrued
Decree of Divorce
Page 2

before the marriage;

5.

(3)

1995 Honda Accord automobile; and

(4)

one-half (V4) of any of Defendant's stock and investment holdings,

CHILD SUPPORT: Child support is ordered to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff

in die amount of $1045 per month, one-half (%) of that amount to be paid on the fifth (5th) and
one-half (Vi) of the twentieth (20th) of each month beginning immediately. (See Plaintiffs Trial
Exhibit 5).
6.

CHILD CARE EXPENSES: Each party is ordered to pay one-half (V4) of any

work- or education-related child care expenses incurred by either party.
7.

ALIMONY : Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff alimony in the amount of

$1200 per month permanently, one-half (lA) of that amount to be paid on the fifth (5th) and onehalf (Vi) on the twentieth (20th) of each month until terminated by law.
8.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: Each party is ordered to pay their own separate

debts. The only marital debt to be paid is the debt to the IRS in the approximate amount of
$19,000, or as may be negotiated later by the parties. Defendant is ordered to pay 80 percent of
the final amount of that debt and Plaintiff 20 percent of the final amount.
9.

INCOME TAX RETURN: Each party is ordered to file jointly for tax year 1996

and divide any reftmd receivedfromthat filing. If there is any liability from that filing, Plaintiff
is ordered to pay 20 percent of that liability and Defendant 80 percent of that liability.

Decree of Divorce
Page 3

10.

INCOME TAX DEDyCTCONS: Plaintiff is awarded the income tax deductions and

exemptions for the minor children. If Defendant is current in all child support and child care
payments for the year in question as of December 31 of that tax year, Defendant may take the
exemptions and deductions for the minor children by reimbursing Plaintiff the amount she pays
in taxes over and above the amount she would pay had she kept the exemptions and deductions.
Defendant is ordered to pay that reimbursement to Plaintiff on or before April 10, five (5) days
prior to the filing deadline.
11.

HEALTH AND ACCTOEOT INSURANCE^

and accident insurance for die minor children with each party paying one-half (%) of any out-ofpocket expenses. Furthermore, Defendant is ordered to help coordinate and insure Plaintiff is
provided access to COBRA coverage under his insurance so long as allowable by law. Plaintiff
is ordered to pay for any coverage for herself under the COBRA plan.
12.

LIFE INSURANCE: Defendant is ordered to maintain the current policies of life

insurance in the amount of $80,000 and $50,000 each, naming the children and Plaintiff as
beneficiaries so long as child support and alimony are payable to the children and Plaintiff.
Should alimony terminate. Defendant is ordered to name the children as sole beneficiaries of those
policies.
13.

ORDER TO WITHHOLD AND DELIVER: An order to withhold and deliver is

authorized although not implemented so long as Defendant maintains an automatic bank transfer
of all of his support paymentsfromhis checking account directly to Plaintiff* $ in the appropriate
Decree of Divorce
Page 4

amounts and times as, ordered in the Decree
administrative cost -' I -i

if" implemented, Defendant is ordered, to pay any

x itMioidtog.

JOSTS A N p /sJTORNEY'S

FEES: Deieudani is ordered, to pay to Plaintiff for

her attorney'" & fees .and costs in this matter die amount of $6880, Plaintiff is awarded a judgment
for Ifia! amount.
SiGM ALL PAPERS: E a ^ pari;,

_ :,, „ , ^ ... papers, documents, titles,

ii 11. .,, etc., necessary to effectuate the transfer of personal property ^v uut between the parties
as set forth.
DATED September eTVJ'

M.

PAT B . BRIAN
District Judge

AS TO FORM:

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN
Attorney for Defendant

ree of Divorce
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Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother
andfatherforwhom support is to be awarded.

1 2a.
|

Enter the fathers and mother's gross monthly income.
Refer to Instructions for definition of income.

I 2b.
K

Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (0
not enter alimony ordered for this case)

3 2c.
I

Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter
obligations ordered for the children in line i).

1 2d.
1
1 3.
1

OPTIONAL; Enter the amountfromLine 12 of ihe
Children in Present Home Worksheet for cither parent.
|
Subtract Lines 2bt 2c, and 2dfrom2a. This is the Adjusted
$
Gross Income for child support purposes.

COMBINED

1 4.
|
1

Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of
children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base
Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.

1 5.
1

Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 '
COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.

1 6.
I

Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each
parent's share of the Base Support Obligation.
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Bring down the amount in Line 6 for the j
Obligor Parent or enter the amountfromthe Low Income Table.
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BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD:

S.

Which parent is die obligor?

( ) Mother

9

Is the support award the same as the guideline amount in Line 7? (x) Yes
If NOt enter the amount ordered: $
_, and answer numbe*

\0

"Wtoat ^we*fc the reason* sm**i V; • •'* wort foi ihe deviation! !
< ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
< ) other: _ _ _ ^ ^

1,

(x) Father

Attorney Bar No, 4S09 ( ) Electronic Filing

____
(X> Manual Filing
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(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default
of the respondent, upon the petitioner's affidavit,
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
History: ILS. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L.
1909,ch.60, § 1;C.L. 1917, § 2999;R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961,
ch. 59, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116,
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1;
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch.
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1;
1997, ch. 47, § 2; 1997, ch. 157, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second
sentence of Subsection (1Kb) and in the second
sentence of Subsection (IKd) substituted "shall
* i . u j
»r«i_n
i
j^irsj
enter the decree for shall make and
file
j j
„ j j , , ., ,
,
ings and decree and added the language beginning "or, in the case o f at the end.

" - ;*> -.i •
- -:V - jly
*
•
r i.dii-i-r
an J -respmut.
'deiciid*
mivugncji
the section
J h p 1997 anie. jment bv ch 157 effe
v;
, 1997. m uDsection i l f\ c. deietec
,. . . a i n t l f f h a , -: i e a a n a c t i o n m t h e ]UC
. a s d e f i n e ( J ^ S e c t l o n 78_1_2.1 w n e r ,
_
;
,.
orogram shall be administered" arter
sentence and
or chlldrer- m the
first
uvhstir chances
a
""
"
^
section is set out as reconciled bv the
find~T
«
,
. - v Legislative
Kesearcn \nd l reneral
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and visitation — Determination of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica(

\ v». en a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in. it
equitabit- orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(in) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses

30-3-5
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incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment oi
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary,
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer tc
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or"
defended against in good faith.
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation.
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and
(iv) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault : :( the pai ties in detei mining
alimony,
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal
ize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
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(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spoi Lse's financial
ability to share living expenses,
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
tne court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the
party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights
are determined.
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
History: R.S. 1898 & CX. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; CX. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993,
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330,
§ 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, deleted a provision
from Subsection (3) for support and maintenance orders; deleted former Subsections (5)
and (6), providing that alimony terminates
upon remarriage, or cohabitation with a member of the opposite sex, by the payee; added

Subsections (7) to (9); renumbered former Subsections (7) and (8) as (5) and (6); and made
stylistic changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997,
substituted "Recovery Services" for "Parts 4
and 5" in Subsection (l)(d) and deleted Subsection (l)(e) which provided for an assesment
against the obligor for a check handling fee.
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 330,
which amended this section, provides in § 2
that the Legislature does not intend that termination of alimony based on cohabitation, in
accordance with Subsection (9), "be interpreted
in any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose,"
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NOTES TO DECISIONS

C o m p i l e r ' s Notes. — In 1997, the Utah
legislature changed the designation of parties
in domestic relations cases from "plaintiff* and
"defendant" to "petitioner" and "respondent."
Annotations from decisions before the amendments will not reflect these changes in terminology.
ANALYSIS

Alimony and support,
—Amount.
Imputed income,
—Cohabitation by payee,
Attorney fees.
Child custody.
—Factors considered.
Child support.
—Estoppel.
Health insurance.
Property division.
—Preliminary orders.
—Retirement funds.
—Unilateral transfer.
Stipulations and agreements of parties.
Alimony a n d s u p p o r t .
• Amount
—- -—Impute• MM nine.
Trial cnurt relying on evidence sufficiently
detailed in its findings of fact, did not abuse its
discretion in imputing income to defendant
spouse for purposes ofdetermining her alimony
;
rard. Willey v. Willey, 914 R2d 1149 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996).
- C o h a b i t a t i o n by p a y e e .
Findings by trial court that former spouse
and person of the opposite sex had a sexual
relationship, shared living expenses, had open
access to each other's condominiums, ate together and shared food expenses, kept clothing
in the same condominium, used the same furniture and otherwise lived as though they were
husband and wife supported the finding of
cohabitation. Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).
Evidence that former wife's current lover had
• key to her house, spent four or five nights a
A-eek there even if she was away, and kept
clothing and other personal effects at her home
supported conclusion that the couple were in
fact residing together, and this, combined with
sexual relationship, was enough to terminate
the former husband's obligation to pay alimony
under the divorce decree. Pendleton v.
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
"Ii ttorney fees.
Because wife did not comply with 'visitation
order contained in her decree, there was no
abuse of discretion by court in awarding attorney fees to husband, the prevailing party. Sigg

v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah, Ct. App. 1995),
Child cuhl

fl i

—Factors considered.
In a child custody suit, the maternal grand
parents failed to prove that no strong mutual
bond existed between the child and the natural
father, that the natural father was unwilling to
sacrifice his own interest and welfare for his
child's, and that the father lacked the sympathy for and understanding of the child that is
generally characteristic of parents; consequently, the maternal grandparents failed to
rebut the parental presumption, which favored
the child's natural father. Duncan v. Howard,
918 R2d 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Child support.
—Estoppel.
Former wife's delay in claiming former husband was making insufficient payments was
not enough to estop her from seeking reimbursement for payments former husband was
legally obligated to make to his children. Ball v.
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Health insurance.
The trial court has broad discretion under
this section to credit one or both parents, as the
court deems equitable, for the coverage provided by a third party; thus, trial court could
credit wife for current husband's insurance
coverage of wife's and her former husband's
children. Ball v. Peterson, 912 P2d 1006 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996).
P r o p e r t y division.
—Preliminary orders.
Decedent's unilateral self-conveyance severing joint tenancy and her conveyance of her
interest in the residence to the trustees of a
revocable trust did not violate the trial court's
order that she and her husband, parties to a
divorce action, neither sell, encumber, nor
mortgage their assets pending the proceedings,
because it did not result in the removal of
property
from
the court's
jurisdiction.
Knickerbocker v. Cannon, 912 P.2d 969 (Utah
1996).
—Retirement funds.
Retirement funds accumulated in a 401(a)
plan during marriage are marital assets and
were appropriately considered by the trial
court. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995).
•— U n i l a t e r a l transfer,
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court was
without jurisdiction to reach funds transferred
by the husband to the children pursuant to the
Uniform Transfers to Minors Act; however, in
making equitable division between the spouses,
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the court may take into consideration transfers
made by the husband at the expense of the wife
and hold him accountable for dissipation of
marital assets. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895 P.2d
835 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

adjustments to parties' stipulated expenses
without any evidence upon which to base such
factual findings, other than the trial court's
apparent pursuit of round numbers. Willey v.
Willey, 914 P.2d 11.49 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),

Stipulations and a g r e e m e n t s of" p a r t i e s .
Court of Appeals would not accept downward
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R, — Child custody:
— age of parent as factor in awarding custody, 34 AX.R.5th 57.
Child support:
— loss of income due to incarceration as
affecting child support obligation, 27 A.L.R.5th
540.
— right to credit on child support payments
for social security or other government dependency payments made for benefit of child, 34
A.L.R.5th 447.

Property settlement:
— workers' compensation benefits as marital
property subject to distribution, 30 AX.R.5th
139.
Miscellaneous:
— treatment of depreciation expenses
claimed for tax or accounting purposes in determining ability to pay child or spousal support, 28 A.L.R.5th 46.

30-3-5.1.

e withholding ii 1 • shild si lp-

VislOli l u i

port order.
Whenever a court enters an order tor child support, it shall include in the
order a provision for withholding income as a means of collecting child support
as provided in Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 30-3-5.1, e n a c t e d b y L.
1985, ch. 11, § 1; 1993, ch. 4, § 70; 1996, ch.
244, § 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 5.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added I n c o m e
Withholding."

HI. eiiecuve July 1, 1997,
^ Services" for "Part 4,
d-

A

30-3-5.2. Allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse
— Investigation.
When, in any divorce proceeding or upon a request for modification of a
divorce decree, an allegation of child abuse or child sexual abuse is made,
implicating either party, the court shall order that an investigation be
conducted by the Division of Child and Family Services within the Department
of Human Services in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 4a. A final award of
custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on that investigation
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted by the Division
of Child and Family Services within 30 days of the court's notice and request
for an investigation In reviewing this report, the court shall comply with
Section 78-7-9,
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, e n a c t e d b y L.
1988, c h . 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 14; 1992,
ch. 213, § 1; 1996, ch. 79, § 48; 1996, ch. 318,
§ 2.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective April 29, 1996, corrected the reference to Chapter 4a.

I'lie 1996 amendment by ch. 318, effective
April 29, 199r* .. rted "Child- and" in two
places and subs:.• . • ed "Chapter 4aw for "Chapter 4, Part 5 r «i tiie end of the first sentence.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

119

78-45 2

UNIFORM CIVIL L : *,-" ""V ~

"TPOKl AuT

78-45-2

Befinitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Adjusted gross income''means income calculated under Subsection
78-45-7.6(1).
(2) "Administrative agency" means the Office of Reco\ ei y Sei » ices or
the Department of Human Services.
(3) "Administrative order" means an order that has been issued by the
Office of Recovery Services, the Department of Human Services, or an
administrative agency of another state or other comparable jurisdiction
with similar authority to that of the office.
(4) "Base child support award" means the award that may be ordered
and is calculated using the guidelines before additions for medical expenses and work-related child care costs.
(5) "Base combined child support obligation table," "child support
table," "base child support obligation table," "low income table," or "table"
means the appropriate table in Section 78-45-7.14.
(6) "Child" means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years who is not otherwise
emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the armed
forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years, while enrolled in high
school during the normal and expected year of graduation and not
otherwise emancipated, self-supporting, married, or a member of the
armed forces of the United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is incapacitated fnnii t j ,truing
a living and is without sufficient means.
(7) "Child support" is defined in Section 62A-11-401
(8) "Child support order" or "support order" is defined in Section
62A-11-401.
(9) "Court" means the district eoui •
(10) "Guidelines" means the child si
-.elines in Sections 78-457.2 through 78-45-7.21.
(11) "Income" is defined in Section 62A-11-303.
(12) "IV-D" means Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section
601 et seq.
(13) "Joint physical custody" means the child stays with each parent
overnight for more than 25% of the year, and both parents contribute to
the expenses of the child in addition to paying child support.
(14) "Medical expenses" means health and dental expenses and related
insurance costs.
(15) "Obligee" is defined in Section 62A-11-103.
(16) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support.
(17) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services.
(18) "Parent" includes a
a
stepparent.
(19) "Split custody" means m a t each parent nat- -ri*.<ica* eu>tocr. ui at
least one of the children.
(20) "State" includes any state, territory, or possession of the United
States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(21) "Stepchild" means any child having a stepparent.
(22) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially married to a child's
natural or adoptive custodial parent who is not the child's natural or
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(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this
chapter.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch
sections (IXa) and (2), added "or adjustment
146, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3; under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been made"
1990, ch. 100, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994, to the end of Subsection (l)(a), and in Subsec' ch. 140, § 14; 1997, ch. 232, § 71.
tion (2) inserted "or a petition to modify an
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) has been
ment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "sub- filed."
stantial change" for "material change" in Sub-

78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or
permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considei ations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the
provisions of this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or orderiiig an
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to
rebut the presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obligations of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before
determining the award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a
decrease in the award.
(6) (a) If a child support order has not been issued or modified within the
previous three years, a parent, legal guardian, or the office may petition
the court to adjust the amount of a child support order.
(b) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (6)(a), the court shall,
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether
there is a difference between the amount ordered and the amount that
would be required under the guidelines. If there is a difference of 10% or
more and the difference is not of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust
the amount to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(c) A showing of a substantial change in circumstances is not necessary
for an adjustment under Subsection (6)(b).
(7) (a) A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the
court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a
substantial change in circumstances
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(b) For purposes of Subsection (7)(a), a substantial change in circumstances may include:
(i) material changes in custody;
(ii) material changes in the relative wealth or assets of the parties;
(iii) material changes of 30% or more in the income of a parent;
(iv) material changes in the ability of a parent to earn;
(v) material changes in the medical needs of the child; and
(vi) material changes in the legal responsibilities of either parent
for the support of others.
(c) Upon receiving a petition under Subsection (7)(a), the court shall,
taking into account the best interests of the child, determine whether a
substantial change has occurred. If it has, the court shall then determine
whether the change results in a difference of 15% or more between the
amount of child support ordered and the amount that would be required
under the guidelines. If there is such a difference and the difference is not
of a temporary nature, the court shall adjust the amount of child support
ordered to that which is provided for in the guidelines.
(8) Notice of the opportunity to adjust a support order under Subsections (6)
and (7) shall be included in each child support order issued or modified after
July 1, 1997.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990,
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4; 1997, ch. 232,
§ 72.

Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1,1997 rewrote Subsection
(6) and added Subsections (7) and (8).

78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources,
except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents,
gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest,
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains,
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from
"nonmeans-tested" government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one
full-time 40-hour job. However, if and only if during the time prior to the
original support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than
40 hours at his job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family
Employment Program;
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training
Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to
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determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross
receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the
amount of business income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly
income.
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and
complete copies of tax returnsfromat least the most recent year unless the
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of
incomefromrecords maintained by the Department of Workforce Services
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax
returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection
(7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon
employment potential and probable earnings as derivedfromwork history,
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to
the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can
earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he
cannot earn minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to
establish basic job skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the
custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a
parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994,
ch. 118, § 7; 1996, ch. 171, § 1; 1997, ch. 29,

§ 1; 1997, ch. 174, § 68; 1997, ch. 375, § 322.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment by ch. 29, effective May 5, 1997, substi-
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tuted "shalT for "may" in Subsection (8Kb).
The 1997 amendment by ch. 174, effective
July 1, 1997, rewrote Subsection (3)(a) which
read lAid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)* and substituted "Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Disability Insurance" for "S.S.I." in Subsection (3)(b).
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The 1997 amendment by ch. 375, effective
July 1, 1997, substituted "Department of
Workforce Services" for "Office of Employment
Security* in Subsection (5)(b).
This section has been set out as reconciled by
the Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation.
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a
client of cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Family
Employment Program, any agreement by the parties for reduction of child
support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative
agency. However, normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent
shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive day requirement.
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the
number of children included in the award.
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.11, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994,
ch. 118, § 12; 1997, ch. 174, § 69.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, substituted "client

of cash assistance provided under Title 35A,
Chapter 8, Part 3, Family Employment Program" for "recipient of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children" in the second sentence of
Subsection (1).

78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and functions.
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, the governor shall appoint an advisory
committee consisting of:
(a) one representative recommended by the Office of Recovery Services;
(b) one representative recommended by the Judicial Council;
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Association;
(d) two representatives of noncustodial parents, one male and one
female, appointed by the governor;
(e) two representatives of custodial parents, one male and one female,
appointed by the governor; and
(f) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed three, who
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association.
(2) (a) Except as required by Subsection (b), as terms of current committee
members expire, the governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to a four-year term.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (a), the governor
shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, .adjust the length of
terms to ensure that the terms of committee members are staggered so
that approximately half of the committee is appointed every two years.
(3) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any reason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired term.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REHN, MARY J.
PLAINTIFF,
SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
-VSCASE NO.

964300048 DA

REHN, CHARLES C.
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 7-26-96
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1996 AT 9:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
AS PER RULES
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY AS PER RULES
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
AS PER RULES
7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
AUGUST 26, 1996
AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
10. IF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL ANTICIPATES THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
WILL SHOW DAMAGES OF LESS THAN $20,000, COUNSEL SHOULD PREPARE AN
ORDER TRANSFERRING THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT.
DATED THIS 26TH DAY OF JULY, 1996.
^
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES INDICjffi%
ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REHN, MARY J.
PLAINTIFF,
SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
-VSCASE NO.

964300048 DA

REHN, CHARLES C.
HONORABLE JUDGE W. BOHLING
DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 2/6/97
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON JUNE 13, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
5.
6.

ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY

7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
JUNE 9, 1997
AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE ••>WW"Hfffr DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING
DATED THIS 6TH DAY OF FEBR
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REHN, MARY J.
PLAINTIFF,
SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
-VSCASE NO.

964300048 DA

REHN, CHARLES C.
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON 6/19/97 APPROXIMATELY
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON AUGUST 14, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
(AS PER RULES)
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY (AS PER RULES)
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
(AS PER RULES)
7.
NO FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
11. OTHER MATTERS: MATTER WAS PRE-TRIED ON 6/9/97; NOT SETTLED : TRIAL DATES OF 6/13/97 & 6/24/97 WERE BUMPED/OTHER TRIALS.
DATED THIS 3RD DAY OF JULY, 1997.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

REHN, MARY J.
PLAINTIFF,
SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE
-VSCASE NO.

964300048 DA

REHN, CHARLES C.
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN
DEFENDANT.
PURSUANT TO THE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE HELD ON (SEE PRIOR NOTICE)
THE FOLLOWING DATES WERE SET AND MATTERS DISCUSSED:
1.
THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON AUGUST 14, 1997 AT 9:00 A.M.
2.
ANTICIPATED TRIAL TIME IS 01 DAYS.
3.
THE CASE IS SET FOR NON JURY TRIAL
4.
ALL DISCOVERY INCLUDING RESPONSES MUST BE CONCLUDED BY
(SEE PRIOR NOTICE)
5.
ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS ARE TO BE HEARD BY (SEE PRIOR NOTICE)
6.
EXHIBIT AND WITNESS LISTS ARE TO BE EXCHANGED BY
(SEE PRIOR NOTICE)
7.
A FINAL PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD ON
AUGUST 11, 1997
AT 2:00 P .M. TRIAL COUNSEL AND CLIENTS, OR
AN INDIVIDUAL WITH AUTHORITY TO SETTLE THIS CASE ARE TO BE
PRESENT. OUT OF STATE PARTIES MUST BE AVAILABLE BY PHONE AT THE
TIME OF THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
8.
FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
MAY RESULT IN A DEFAULT.
9.
THE FOREGOING DATES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FIRM SETTINGS
AND WILL NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT COURT ORDER, AND THEN ONLY
UPON A SHOWING OF MANIFEST INJUSTICE. COUNSEL ARE INSTRUCTED TO
STAY IN CONTACT WITH THE CLERK OF THIS COURT AS THE TRIAL DATE
APPROACHES REGARDING THE TRIAL SETTING.
11.
OTHER MATTERS: (PRE-TRIAL IS SET AT JUDGE BRIAN'S REQUEST) (TRIAL IS SET FOR 1/2 TO 1 DAY)
,,,
DATED THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY, 1997.
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 0,fwj|/* + Vf,T |
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COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES AT THE ADDRESSES IND%TA^ED O ^ T f f i ^
HED MAILING
MAILING CERTIFICATE.
CERTIFICATE.
%.Q/'/t,,,,,,,
ATTACHED
« r »lAsJi^ \ ^
In compliance wah the Americans with Disabilities Act. individuals needing special
accommodations fwduding auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this
proceedmg should call Third District/Circuit Court (801)3364451 ext 20S.
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Current Expenses
Rent - $1050/month - Exhibit A
Car payment - S575/mo - Exhibit B
Water - 538/month - Exhibit C
Sewer- $28/mo - Exhibit D
Phone - $63/month - Exhibit E
Gas (Mountain Fuels) -$58/mo - Exhibit F
Auto Gas/oil/repair - $ 100/mo - Exhibit G
Car insurance - $ 142/mo - Exhibit H
Renters insurance - $ 16/mo - Exhibit I
Life Insurance - $52/mo - Exhibit J
Medical/Vision/Dental - $214/mo - Exhibit K
Food - $400/mo - Exhibit L
Laundry and Dry Cleaning - S50/mo - Exhibit M
Entertainment (clubs,social obligations,travel,recreation) - $150/mo
Daycare - $136/mo - Exhibit O
Legal - $200/mo — deferred
Motor Vehicle Registration - $20/mo - Exhibit Q
Maintenance(household) - $50/mo — d e f e r r e d
Clothing - $ 100/mo " d e f e r r e d
Incidentals - $150/mo — deferred
Electric Bill - $46/mo - Exhibit X
Subtotal - $3,638
Current child support - $1055/mo
Current temporary alimony - $750/mo
Total monthly expenditures - $5443/mo
Monthly take home pay - $4838/mo
Current deficit - $604/mo

Sheetl

i

Mary and Charles Rehn
Joint Checking Account - 11995

Expenses

January

February
635
240
50
190
.'_"!___ 643

Food
Utilities/phone
Gas-car
Car ins.
Med/dental
Child care
Clothes

j

60
16
1 2

90
282
——

rent+car
| f otal Expenses

March

[

April
974
240

"7 8

7

"

20
35
25
37
7

June

May
905
185
50
"280
380
160
181

643
175
89

126"

Incidentals
church
haircuts
misc.
school/books
Total Incidental
Entertainment
health club
misc. ent.
Total Entertainm ent

-;

_

1000
150
95
98
50
343
330

5
42
52

17 _U_

J

July

August

1090
122
110
192
98
290
95

972
" 380
105

20

50

260

^70

39
62
106

foo

50

J78

108
90
198

1575

1575

1575

1575

1575

3852

4164

^952 [

4647

3876

1575
4061

__

1240
125

96

94

20
175
135

300

23
25
1T5

112
80
192

103
246
349

931
127

28

108
100
208

107
31
138

September Ave. mo.

78

2&

90
90

JZ3371
3391

23

117
125
242

Expenses

865
192
62
118
174
"f43
190

Food
Utilities/phone
Gas-car
Car ins.
Med/dental
Child care
Clothes'_

20
19
25
44
108

Incidentals
church
haircuts
misc.
school/books
total Incidental

r

Entertainment
94 health club
123 misc. ent.
217 Total Entertainment

1575

1575 rent+car

3725

3959 Total Expenses

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
Page 1
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